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In this thesis, game theoretic analysis of wireless communication networks
has been performed. Game theory provides valuable tools can be used to
solve problem of conflict and cooperation in wireless communication networks.
Game theoretic tools can be applied to multiple layers of wireless networks.
First, we consider power control issues at the physical layer of wireless net-
works. A game theoretic analysis for resource allocation policies in fading
interference channels in the presence of quality of service (QoS) constraints is
performed. We model a two player non-cooperative power control game and
assume that both transmitters and receivers know the channel side informa-
tion. The transmitters in this game are selfish and rational with QoS limita-
tions and average power constraints. We prove that there is a unique admis-
sible Nash equilibrium of this non-cooperative power control game. Secondly,
a pseudonym change game which is used to protect location information in
mobile networks has been proposed. In mobile networks, in order to track the
location of mobile nodes, an adversary will monitor the pseudonym of each
node. Therefore, mobile nodes are encouraged to change their pseudonyms
in mix zones to increase their location security level and get rid of the tracker.
However, pseudonyms are costly so some mobile nodes may not cooperate
and change their pseudonyms when they already have high location security
level. In order to achieve an optimal security level, game theoretical models
have been used. The goal of each mobile user in this game is to maximize
its location security level with a minimum pseudonym change cost. We con-
sider non-cooperative incomplete information game, where mobile nodes do
not know their opponents’ payoff function and types. We numerically demon-
strate that a mobile user becomes selfish when the pseudonym change cost is
small. Oppositely, if the cost is high, mobile nodes cooperate more. A game-
theory-based anti-tracking protocol is also proposed at the end.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Unlike traditional infrastructure networks which is shown in Fig. 1.1, wireless
ad hoc network [1][2] is a network that does not rely on a predefined infras-
tructure. It has a set of wireless nodes which have the ability to build and
form a network. Based on the explanation from Webster, the two definitions
for ad hoc are: ”formed or used for specific or immediate problems”, and
”fashioned from whatever is immediately available.” These definitions tell us
that the ad hoc network can be set up for a specific application and they can
also be built by several immediate available nodes. Other than basic features
above, ad hoc network can avoid the installation and maintenance of network
infrastructure and be set up very quickly. Overall, ad hoc network is a robust,
dynamic and self-organizing network architecture with a distributed nature
and node redundancy, as shown in Fig. 1.2. Since the wireless ad hoc network
has the decentralized nature, it suits for a lot of applications. Over the last
several years, many design principles for ad hoc network have been developed
2Figure 1.1: Infrastructure network.
[3][4][5]. However, more research still needs to be done to improve the capa-
bility and performance of this type network. In the following sections, I will
briefly talk about the major applications for wireless ad hoc networks together
with the challenges.
Generally, wireless ad hoc networks can be classified by their applications.
First, the self-configuring wireless network with mobile devices is named mo-
bile ad hoc network (MANET) [6]. It’s a network that can achieve the goal of
”getting connected anywhere and at any time”. The mobile devices in MANET
can establish links between each devices when they move in any direction at
any selected time. For example, a group of people with cell phones and laptops
are having a meeting in a conference room where no network service is avail-
able. In this case, they can easily build an ad hoc network using their devices
so that they can share the information they have regardless of their physical
3Figure 1.2: Wireless Ad Hoc Network.
location. MANETs has been a really hot topic for 15 years because of the huge
numbers of laptops and cell phones. Basically, there are three types of MANET
for different application scenarios: Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) [7],
Intelligent vehicular ad hoc networks (InVANETs) [8] and Internet Based Mo-
bile Ad Hoc Networks (iMANET) [9]. VANETs are used for communication
between vehicles and roadside stations. They fully use the self-configuring fea-
ture of ad hoc network to develop connection between a set of vehicles and
roadside equipment. InVANETs are an upgraded version of VANETs. They
can make the vehicles behave smarter with the features of artificial intelligence
setup so that the possibility of having a traffic accident is decreased. iMANET
are ad hoc networks which link mobile nodes. Second, a communication net-
work with radio nodes organized in a mesh topology is called wireless mesh
network (WMN) [10]. It can be considered as a special type of ad hoc network.
4It provides a solution that uses a number of access points connected point to
point. The mobile nodes in WMN can forward data from gateways without
internet connection. The coverage area of the mobile nodes is named a mesh
cloud. With this mesh cloud, even if one node can no longer operate, the other
mobile nodes can still forward information to each other. The WMN is a new
wireless LAN technology that addresses the market’s requirement of highly
scalable and cost-effective networks. It offers users secure, seamless roaming
anytime and anywhere. Third, wireless sensor networks are developed to mon-
itor certain environmental conditions. It is a network with numerous sensor
nodes. For each node, it has a circuit board with low power transceiver, mi-
crocontroller, antenna, and certain sensor devices. The cost of one sensor node
varies based on the complexity of the structure. There are various types of
topologies for sensor networks. The simple topology can be a small star net-
work and the complex one can be a multi-hop mesh network. Such sensor
arrays systems have great potential for use in many application scenarios. For
example, they can be set up in home and detect the location of the smoke and
can also track the spread of the smoke. It can also be used to monitor a traffic
tunnel and see if there is any accident happening.
1.2 Design Challenges
Based on the above introduction, the main characteristic of wireless ad hoc
networks is their lack of infrastructure. This means that unlike the cellular sys-
tems, the mobile nodes of the wireless ad hoc network all have control func-
tions and communication functions. Thus, with a number of mobile nodes,
wireless ad hoc network can form a network hierarchy at any place and any
5Figure 1.3: Re-created from Andrea Goldsmith 2005, ”Wireless ad hoc network
five layer model”.
time. In networks, a five-layer model is used [2]. The five layers are applica-
tion layer, transport layer, network layer, access layer, and physical layer. These
layers are described in Fig. 1.3 [2]. In different layers, there are different issues
which also bring different challenges to the network design. The first challenge
is the power control issue [11] for mobile nodes. If the node has enough power,
the node can transmit data to any other node. However, in reality, the power
of one node cannot be considered as infinity. In fixed transmit power condi-
6tion, the SINR between two nodes will decrease when distance between nodes
increases. Furthermore, the SINR also changes randomly due to fading and in-
terference. If the SINR of the link is very low, the bit error will increase and the
node will not transmit due to this poor channel condition. Since the transmis-
sion between each node may have poor performance due to the low SINR and
interference from other links, it’s better to select a power adaption scheme to
dynamicly change transmission power for each node so that it can assure that
its SINR is large enough to transmit data. The power adaption scheme choice
becomes a key to solve power control issue. Secondly, the energy constraint
for mobile node is also a significant challenge. The mobile nodes are equipped
with batteries. It is hard to replace the batteries or recharge them especially
for some underground or underwater applications. It is obvious that the con-
strained energy of mobile nodes highly impacts the design of wireless ad hoc
networks. In this case, the mobile nodes can only transmit finite number of bits
and hence the data transmission should be more efficient. The sleep mode has
to be introduced in the design of mobile nodes in order to save some energy
because the node cannot transmit or stand by all the time otherwise the batter-
ies will die soon. However, if the node has a sleep mode, the wireless ad hoc
network design will be more complicated. Overall, the energy consumption
is a key issue that needs to be optimized over all layers. Thirdly, scalability
issue [2] is always a problem for wireless ad hoc network. As the network
grows based on its application, protocols needs to scale as well. The protocol
processing requires a lot of energy in mobile nodes which brings a trade off
that how much load should be processed for single node versus transferring
processing load to centralized node to deal with. Finally, the security is always
a key issue to consider while designing a wireless network [12]. Usually, we
7need to consider this problem on three aspects: availability, confidentiality and
authentication. Availability guarantees that the network can handle denial of
services attacks which can be introduced at any layer. Confidentiality ensures
the information like data and routing information must be never exposed to
unauthorized users. The authentication ensures that a node knows the identity
of the node it is communicating with. Therefore, the adversary cannot use a
third party unauthorized node to access the sensitive information or interfere
with the operation. Since the wireless ad hoc network has the characteristic
of the lack of infrastructure, this also brings a number of challenges. As the
mobile nodes of wireless ad hoc network sometimes work in poor environ-
ments, the ad-hoc network should choose a distributed architecture. If the
ad-hoc network uses central entity architecture, it may bring a significant secu-
rity problem. Moreover, the trust relationship between each node will change
due to ad hoc network’s lack of infrastructure. Therefore, dynamic security
mechanisms are needed for wireless ad hoc networks.
8Chapter 2
Game Theory in Wireless
Communication
2.1 Game Theory
Game theory provides variable tools can be used to solve the problem of con-
flict and cooperation. The first discussion about game theory was provided
by James Waldegrave in 1838. In 1944, Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
established the connection between economic behavior and game theory [13].
In 1950, John Nash provided the concept of Nash equilibrium [14] which is a
list of strategies for each player in the game. Nash equilibrium demonstrates
the property that no player can unilaterally change his own strategy in order
to get a better payoff. It is the central concept of a non cooperative game. The
goal of game theory is finding the best actions for individual players in various
scenarios. The game should have at least two players. Depending on the ap-
plication scenarios, the player can be a company, a poker card or, in our case, a
wireless node. Each player has some strategies which will determine the out-
9come of the game. The outcome caused by different players will be expressed
by a number of payoffs.
Games can be classified into two types [15][16]: Cooperative game and non-
cooperative game.
2.1.1 Cooperative Game
A cooperative game is a game in which players can make binding commitment.
Therefore, the players in the game will demonstrate cooperative behavior and
the game is not a competition between individual players. The cooperative
game [13][17] pays attention to the fairness and effectiveness. For example,
two cars are running on the same narrow road head to head. In this situation,
the drivers should choose a side to swerve in order to avoid the accident. If the
drivers cooperate with each other and choose different sides to swerve, they
can avoid the accident. If they choose the same side, they cannot pass each
other. This is a typical cooperative game example. If we assign the payoff of
pass for one driver as ”0”, then the payoff of collide will be ”5”. In this case,
there are two Nash equilibrium: driver A swerve to left and driver B swerve
to right, or driver A swerve to right and driver B swerve to left. As long as
they choose different side, they can have a Pareto efficient solution. Table 2.1
illustrates the result of this case.
Table 2.1: Choosing sides for cars.
left right
left (0,0) (5,5)
right (5,5) (0,0)
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2.1.2 Non-Cooperative Game
In non-cooperative game [18][13], players make decisions independently. The
focus of non cooperative games is player’s individual optimal strategy. Based
on different criteria, non cooperative games can be divided into two types:
Complete information game and incomplete information game. For complete
information game, the player has full knowledge of its opponent including
strategies and payoff function. The typical example of non cooperative game is
prisoner’s dilemma. In this story, two persons are arrested in the jail. The at-
torney wants them to confess their crime so she offered them a deal separately:
”With enough evidences, if both of you do not confess the crime, you two will
stay in jail for 1 year. If you confess the crime and the other guy confesses the
crime too, you two will have to stay in jail for 5 years. However, if you confess
the crime and the other guy does not confess, you don’t have to stay in the jail
but the other guy have to stay in jail for 11 years. It also works in the opposite
way which means if you do not confess but the other guy does, you will stay in
jail for 11 years.” Table 2.2 demonstrates the situation of prisoner’s dilemma.
Table 2.2: Prisoner’s dilemma.
prisoner A confess prisoner A non-confess
prisoner B confess (5,5) (0,11)
prisoner B non-confess (11,0) (1,1)
Apparently, the prisoner’s dilemma is a complete information non-cooperative
game. Each player has two strategies and knows his opponent’s strategies. The
assumption of the game is that each player in this game is rational individually
and each player also assumes their opponent is rational. The years one player
will stay in the jail are payoff of the player. Thus, a smaller payoff value is
11
preferred by both prisoners individually. The case that both prisoners confess
the crime will be the best strategy that they can choose by themselves without
cooperation. Therefore, (confess,confess) is the Nash equilibrium in this case
but it is not Pareto optimal because (not confess, not confess) have a better
result.
2.2 Game Theoretic Analysis of Wireless
Communications
Wireless ad hoc network has a dynamic and self-organizing architecture. This
dynamic characteristic increases the difficulty of using analytical models to
analyze the performance of wireless ad hoc networks. Game theory offers
several mathematical tools to solve this issue. With game theory, we can model
the interaction and competition between wireless nodes of an ad hoc network
[19].
For the last ten years, game theory has been widely used as an efficient
analysis tool in the telecommunication area. Most of the time, the object is the
traditional network. In recent years, as the interest in wireless ad hoc network
increases, developing communication games for ad hoc networks become an
attractive topic. For example, considering a problem in the MAC layer, the
Aloha protocol has been implemented in a wireless ad hoc network. Because
of the dynamic architecture of wireless ad hoc network, the total number of
mobile nodes in the network is unknown. The optimal retransmit probability
is undecided. Therefore, in order to achieve the maximum throughput, an
adaptive retransmit scheme with dynamic retransmit probability needs to be
12
developed for this network. However, we still do not know if the adaptive
scheme can reach a steady state. We are also wondering if certain perturbations
will change the node behavior or cause some undesired result. Game theory
provides an ideal tool to solve these issues. Game theory does not only suit for
MAC layer, but also suits for physical, transport, and other layers.
In wireless ad hoc network communication, nodes make choices indepen-
dently while considering their environment and other nodes’ activity. It is
exactly like what a player does in a game. Therefore, with reasonable map-
ping, we can apply game theory to wireless ad hoc network scenarios. In
a game, there are three important components: players, strategy and utility
function. In the wireless ad hoc network, mobile nodes will act as players and
their strategies are those decisions they made such as transmiting the packets
or not, the power level setting, pseudonym change or not, choice of modulation
scheme. The payoff functions are the metrics like throughput, delay, or SINR.
The Fig. 2.1 shows the mapping relationship between game and wireless ad
hoc network.
Game theory can provide many benefits for ad hoc networks. First, it is
a strong tool to analyze network protocols because it can investigate a steady
state operating point of networks. Second, it can provide a good mathematical
tool to model the system and solve some cross layer problems. Third, it is also
a excellent candidate to design incentive mechanisms for network. Although
game theory has a lot of great properties that can be performed on wireless
ad hoc network, it still has challenges to be solved. Though game theory has
strong ability to provide a mathematical model for the network problem, it is
still not perfect. It is also difficult to design a utility function to evaluate differ-
ent performance levels. Finally, game theoretic analysis on ad hoc networks is
13
Figure 2.1: The relation between games and ad hoc networks.
based on the assumption that players act rationally. Although we can program
this behavior for wireless nodes, it does not accurately reflect the practical oc-
casions. It is possible that wireless nodes do not perform rationally. The list of
benefits and challenges are shown in Fig. 2.2.
When we use game theory to analyze the wireless ad hoc network, selfish
behavior of nodes becomes a big issue because it may make network reach
an undesirable suboptimal equilibrium [20][21][22]. In order to limit the selfish
behavior of nodes, incentive mechanisms are introduced to wireless ad hoc net-
work design so nodes can have less selfish moves and the network can reach a
desirable optimal result. As mentioned in the literature, incentive mechanisms
can be divided into two categories: credit-exchange systems and reputation
14
Figure 2.2: Benefits and Challenges of the game.
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systems.
One technique to provide incentives is called credit exchange[23][24]. For
this mechanism, a charge and reward system has been adopted into the wire-
less ad hoc network. If a wireless node cooperates with other same type nodes
(nodes with the same network goal), it will be credited. If a node does not
cooperate or cooperates with other nodes, it will be debited. In [23], a ”to-
ken reward” method has been introduced to implement this credit exchange
mechanism. If the nodes provide services, they will be rewarded a token. If
they request services, the token they have will be decreased. Reputation based
mechanism [25] is another technique to create incentive. Based on the commu-
nication between wireless nodes, the wireless nodes interact with other nodes
in the network and assign the reputation value to their neighbors. The goal
of the player is to try to build a good reputation by cooperating with other
players. If the node’s reputation value is low, it will be isolated from the net-
work. Game theory is used to analyze this mechanism and try to improve the
reputation value of the nodes in the network in order to stimulate the nodes to
cooperate with each other.
16
Chapter 3
Non-Cooperative Power Control
Games for Wireless Communication
Networks
In this chapter, we will perform a game theoretic analysis of the physical layer
of a wireless communication system. At the physical layer analysis, the trans-
mit power of wireless nodes has a huge impact. Ideally, two random nodes in
the network can communicate with each other with sufficient power. However,
if the transmit power is too high, significant interference will be generated to
other nodes which will degrade other node’s performance. Furthermore, in
practical scenarios, a wireless node has limited energy and hence cannot afford
high power consumption. Recently, game theory has been introduced to solve
the transmit power and resource allocation issues. For instance, in [26], an it-
erative water-filling power control algorithm through a non-cooperative game
in the digital subscriber lines has been presented. A game theoretic analysis
on multi-access fading channel is also provided by Lai and Gamal [27]. They
17
Figure 3.1: System model.
prove that the maximum sum rate of the capacity region is the unique Nash
equilibrium. Qiao also provided a power control game analysis on multiple-
access channel with the consideration of quality of service (QoS) constraints
[28]. Therefore, the multiple access channel has been considered many times
from a game-theoretic perspective. It is interesting to apply game theoretic
analysis the game to other channel models.
We focus on a non-cooperative power control game on interference channels
with QoS constraints. The effective capacity is employed as the throughput
metric in our game.
18
3.1 System Model
The scenario we consider is that M users communicate with M receivers with
individual power constraints and QoS constraints. The system model is shown
in Fig. 3.1. We assumed that data sequences that are generated by transmitters
have been divided into frames of duration T. At the transmitter side, there is a
buffer which is used to store data frames before they are transmitted over the
wireless channel. The discrete-time signal received at the first receiver in the
ith symbol duration is given by
y1[i] =
M
∑
j=1
hj1[i]xj[i] + n[i], i = 1, 2, . . . (3.1)
where M is the number of users, xj[i] denotes the complex-valued channel in-
put and hj1[i] is the fading coefficient between the jth user and the first receiver.
We assume that hj1[i] is jointly stationary and ergodic discrete-time process and
so is the other fading coefficient, and we denote the magnitude-square of the
fading coefficients by zj1[i] = |hj1[i]|2. Additionally, we assume that the band-
width available in the system is B. Therefore, average energy constraint can be
expressed as E{|xj[i]|2} ≤ P¯j/B for all i, indicating that the average power of
the system is constrained by P¯ and the channel input of user j should be sub-
ject to the average energy constraint in this model. Since the bandwidth is B,
symbol rate is assumed to be B complex symbols per second. y[i] is the chan-
nel output and n[i] is a zero-mean, circularly symmetric, complex Gaussian
random variable with variance E{|n[i]|2} = N0. The additive Gaussian noise
samples {n[i]} are assumed to form an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) sequence.
19
In this system model, we assume that both the transmitters and the re-
ceivers know the channel state z = {z11, z12 . . . , zMM}. It is possible that one
node broadcasts the estimated perfect z to all the other users. Although im-
plicitly, the channel state varies much more slowly than the data rate so that
tracking the channel can be done exactly with negligible cost and feedback [29].
Under this condition, dynamic power and rate allocation can be performed in
accordance with the changing channels.
For a given power allocation policy U = {µ1(z), · · · , µM(z)}, where µj ≥
0, ∀j can be viewed as a function of z, the achievable rates are defined as [29]
R(U ) =
{
R : R(S) ≤ Ez
{
B log2
(
1+ ∑
j∈S
µj(z)z
)}
,
∀S ⊂ {1, · · · , M}
}
, (3.2)
If all transmitters and receivers have CSI, the rate of one transmitter is provided
by
RIF =
⋃
U∈F
R(U ) (3.3)
where F is the set of all feasible power control policies satisfying the average
power constraint
F ≡ {U : Ez
{
µj(z)
} ≤ SNRj, µj ≥ 0, ∀j} (3.4)
where SNRj = P¯j/(N0B) denotes the average transmitted signal-to-noise ratio
of user j. The maximum instantaneous rate at a given state with any decoding
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order pi can be obtained as
Rpi(k) = B log2
(
1+
µpi(k)zpi(k)
1+ ∑Mi=k+1 µpi(i)zpi(i)
)
bits/s, k = 1, · · · , M. (3.5)
3.2 Effective Capacity
In order to guarantee a statistical QoS requirement, the concept of effective
capacity [30] is introduced in this section. It is the maximum constant arrival
rate1 that a given service process can support. In this problem, we describe
the statistic QoS requirement by the QoS exponent θ and we define LQ as the
stationary queue length. Therefore, θ is considered to be the decay rate of the
tail distribution of the queue length LQ:
lim
q→∞
log P(LQ ≥ q)
q
= −θ. (3.6)
If we have a large qmax, we can derive the buffer violation probability as:
P(LQ ≥ qmax) ≈ e−θqmax . Thus, larger θ represents more strict QoS con-
straints, smaller θ indicates looser QoS guarantees. Furthermore, if LD is
the steady-state delay appeared in the buffer, then we can have expression
P(LD ≥ dmax) ≈ e−θδdmax for large dmax and the arrival and service processes
[31] determines δ.
1For time-varying arrival rates, effective capacity specifies the effective bandwidth of the
arrival process that can be supported by the channel.
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In [31], Tang and Zhang demonstrated a method which used the effective
capacity to solve a resource allocation in audio and video application problem.
The effective capacity can be expressed as
RC(θ) = −Λ(−θ)θ = − limt→∞
1
θt
logeE{e−θS[t]} bits/s, (3.7)
where Λ(−θ) is a function which depends on the logarithmic moment gener-
ating function of S[t]. S[t] = ∑ti=1 s[i] is the time-accumulated service process.
In our case, we consider a general fading distribution. We also assume that
fading coefficients are constant over the frame duration in order to simplify
our problem. The fading coefficients change independently for each frame and
each user. Under these assumptions, s[i] = TR[i], where R[i] is the instanta-
neous service rate in the ith frame duration [iT; (i + 1)T]. Thus, (3.7) can be
denoted as
RC(θ) = − 1θT logeEz{e
−θTR[i]} bits/s. (3.8)
The effective capacity normalized by bandwidth B is
RC(θ) =
RC(θ)
B
bits/s/Hz. (3.9)
3.3 The Power Control Game
In this section, we discuss a two-player interference channel game. In this
game, users are selfish and they all try to send data to their respective desti-
nation. The goal of them is to try to maximize their transmission rate based
on their average power constraint on interference channel. Since the channel
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model we consider in this game is interference channel, each node will gener-
ate interference to other transmission link, while it tries to send its own data
to its own target node. We assume that (θ1, θ2) is a vector composed of the
QoS constraints for the two users and β j =
θjTB
loge 2
, j = 1, 2 is the corresponding
normalized QoS constraint.
The power control game we consider is a two-player non-cooperative game.
The power control policy µj(z) can be expressed as the strategy of user j. The
payoff of this game is the normalized effective capacity Cj(U ). The goal of user
j in this game is
max
µj
Cj(µj, µ−j) s.t. µj ∈ Fj, (3.10)
where F is given in (3.4), and µ−j is the power control policies of the other
users. In this interference channel game, one user transmits data continuously
to its target destination. At the same time, it produces interference to its neigh-
bors’s objective receiver. For a given power control policy µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22)
of user 2, the payoff of user 1 is given by
C1(U ) = − 1
θ1TB
loge
E
{
e
−θ1TB log2
(
1+ µ1(z11,z12,z21,z22)z111+µ2(z11,z12,z21,z22)z21
)}
= − 1
θ1TB
loge
( ∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0(
1+
µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22)z11
1+ µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22)z21
)−β1
×
pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz11dz12dz21dz22
)
(3.11)
where pz(z11, z12, z21, z22) is the joint probability density function of the
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channel state. Since transmitter 2 has the same properties as transmitter 1,
the payoff for user 2 is similar to the payoff of user 1 and it is expressed as
C2(U ) = − 1
θ2TB
loge
E
{
e
−θ2TB log2
(
1+ µ2(z11,z12,z21,z22)z221+µ1(z11,z12,z21,z22)z12
)}
= − 1
θ2TB
loge
( ∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0(
1+
µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22)z22
1+ µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22)z12
)−β2
×
pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz11dz12dz21dz22
)
(3.12)
From the above equations, two strategies (µ1, µ2) become the dominant fac-
tors of the effective capacity payoff function of user 1 and user 2. Hence, in
order to reach the goal of this game, we bring the following definition.
Definition 1 A Nash equilibrium is a policy pair (µ∗1 , µ
∗
2) such that
C1(µ∗1 , µ
∗
2) ≥ C1(µ′1, µ∗2), ∀µ′1 ∈ F1
C2(µ∗1 , µ
∗
2) ≥ C2(µ∗1 , µ′2), ∀µ′2 ∈ F2. (3.13)
As illustrated by the definition, no user can benefit by using non-optimal strat-
egy individually. If we consider a case with fixed power policy µ2(z1, z2), the
optimal strategy of user 1 can be reached by solving the solution to the follow-
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ing maximization problem
C1 = max
µ1
− 1
θ1TB
loge
( ∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0(
1+
µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22)z11
1+ µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22)z21
)−β1
× pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz11dz12dz21dz22
)
,
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22)×
pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz11dz12dz21dz22 ≤ SNR1,
µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) ≥ 0 (3.14)
It also can be further reduced to the following minimization problem
min
µ1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
(
1+
µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22)z11
1+ µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22)z21
)−β1
× pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz11dz12dz21dz22,
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22)×
pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz11dz12dz21dz22 ≤ SNR1,
µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) ≥ 0 (3.15)
The solution to the above optimization problem is the power allocation similar
to [31]
µ1(z) =
 (1+ µ2(z)z21) β1β1+1
α
1
β1+1
1 z
β1
β1+1
11
− 1+ µ2(z)z21
z11

+
(3.16)
=
1+ µ2(z)z21
z11
((
z11
α1(1+ µ2(z)z21)
) 1
β1+1 − 1
)+
(3.17)
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where (x)+ = max{x, 0}, α1 is the threshold chosen to satisfy the following
power constraint
∫ ∞
α1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
 (1+ µ2(z)z21) β1β1+1
α
1
β1+1
1 z
β1
β1+1
11
− 1+ µ2(z)z21
z11

+
× pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz22dz12dz21dz11 = SNR1. (3.18)
Similarly the optimal power policy of user 2 can be derived as
µ2(z1, z2) =
 (1+ µ1(z)z12) β2β2+1
α
1
β2+1
2 z
β1
β2+1
22
− 1+ µ1(z)z12
z22

+
(3.19)
where α2 is the threshold chosen to satisfy the power constraint
∫ ∞
α2
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
 (1+ µ1(z)z12) β2β2+1
α
1
β2+1
2 z
β2
β2+1
22
− 1+ µ1(z)z12
z22

+
× pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz11dz12dz21dz22 = SNR2. (3.20)
Based on the above analysis, the optimal policy of one user cannot be reached
by only adjusting its own parameters. It also depends on its assumption of the
other user’s strategy. According to the assumption, transmitters are going to
adjust their threshold value and power control policy to achieve the maximum
normalized effective capacity in this game. Therefore, the above analysis shows
that the power constraints of the two users must be satisfied with equality at
the Nash equilibrium. Considering the expressions (3.16) and (3.19), we have
the following result.
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Proposition 1 With every pair of (α1, α2), a unique pair of strategies (µ1, µ2) should
exist.
Proof: First, we consider that if user 1 decides to transmit, or µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) >
0, from (3.17), we have
z11
α1(1+ µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22)z21)
> 1. (3.21)
The channel state of transmitter 1 is normalized by the interference from trans-
mitter 2 and channel noise. From the above equation, we can find out that if
µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) > 0, the channel state is greater than the threshold. Since
the transmitter 2 has the same situation, we can derive the condition for trans-
mitter 2 as the equation
z22
α2(1+ µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22)z12)
> 1. (3.22)
When they decide to transmit data separately, they have different conditions.
Thus, we will consider the condition that they transmit data at the same time
at the next step. In this situation, both conditions (3.21) and (3.22) should be
satisfied. Let’s consider three cases with an assumption that the pair (α1, α2)
exist: only node 1 transmits, only node 2 transmits and both nodes transmit
together.
In the case that only node 1 transmits, we have µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22) = 0, and
condition (3.21) can be satisfied while (3.22) cannot. According to (3.16), we
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can derive that
µ10(z11, z12, z21, z22) =
1
α
1
β1+1
1 z
β1
β1+1
11
− 1
z11
. (3.23)
Then we substitute µ10(z11, z12, z21, z22) and µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22) into (3.21) and
(3.22), we have
Z1 =
{
z : z11 > α1,
z22
α2
≤ α1(1+ µ10z12)
}
(3.24)
The above condition illustrated the region in which only node 1 transmits.
When only node 2 transmits, we have a similar situation that µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) =
0. Then, we have the region that only node 2 transmits as follow
µ20(z11, z12, z21, z22) =
1
α
1
β2+1
2 z
β2
β2+1
22
− 1
z22
, (3.25)
Z2 =
{
z : z22 > α2,
z11
α1
≤ α2(1+ µ20z21)
}
. (3.26)
When both nodes transmit, (3.21) and (3.22) can be satisfied. We can find
out that µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) is upperbounded by
z22
α2
−1
z12
and µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22)
is upperbounded by
z11
α1
−1
z21
. Since the region in which none of the nodes is
transmitting is derived previously as
Z0 = {z : z22 ≤ α2, z11 ≤ α1} , (3.27)
the region in which both nodes transmit is Z3 which is the one other than the
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above three regions.
We have 
µ1(z) =
(1+µ2(z)z21)
β1
β1+1
α
1
β1+1
1 z
β1
β1+1
11
− 1+µ2(z)z21z11
µ2(z) =
(1+µ1(z)z12)
β2
β2+1
α
1
β2+1
2 z
β2
β2+1
22
− 1+µ1(z)z12z22
(3.28)
which can be written as
 1+ µ1(z)z11 + µ2(z)z21 =
(
z11
α1
) 1
β1+1 (1+ µ2(z)z21)
β1
β1+1
1+ µ1(z)z12 + µ2(z)z22 =
(
z22
α2
) 1
β2+1 (1+ µ1(z)z12)
β2
β2+1
. (3.29)
With α1, α2, z1, z2, we try to establish monotonic properties for µ1 and µ2
(3.28) and we find that µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) is a concave function of µ2(z11, z12, z21,
z22) and µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22) is a concave function of µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22). It is
clear that we may find a intersection in the µ1 − µ2 plane caused by these two
curves. This intersection demonstrates that there is a (µ21(z), µ
2
2(z)) satisfying
the both equations. Consider the function µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) of µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22),
if µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) > 0, then we have µ2(z) ∈ (0,
z11
α1
−1
z21
). It means that curve
has a intersection with µ2 = 0 at
µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) =
1
α
1
β1+1
1 z
β1
β1+1
11
− 1
z11
> 0. (3.30)
Similarly, let’s consider the function µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22) of µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22).
We have µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) ∈ (0,
z22
α2
−1
z12
). The curve will have a intersection at
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µ1 = 0 as
µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22) =
1
α
1
β2+1
2 z
β2
β2+1
22
− 1
z22
> 0. (3.31)
Therefore, at least one intersection (µ21(z11, z12, z21, z22), µ
2
2(z11, z12, z21, z22)) be-
tween the two curves can be derived based on the above analysis.
Then we are going to see if this result is unique. We assume that another
point (µ′1
2(z11, z12, z21, z22), µ′2
2(z11, z12, z21, z22)) is satisfying (3.28). In order
to prove the result, we also assume µ′1
2(z11, z12, z21, z22) < µ21(z11, z12, z21, z22).
From the equation in (3.29), we also have that µ′2
2(z11, z12, z21, z22) < µ22(z11, z12,
z21, z22). Then we can see that these two points are staying on a line I and their
slope is positive. Due to the concavity of the curve, if the interception of I on
µ1 = 0 is not greater than 0, then the curve for µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22) as a function
of µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) will have a intersection on µ1 = 0 as a negative value
so that µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22) < 0 at µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) = 0. However, it is not
satisfied by (3.31). Similarly, if the interception of I on µ2 = 0 is less than 0,
we can derive that µ1(z11, z12, z21, z22) < 0 at µ2(z11, z12, z21, z22) = 0, it also
violates (3.30). Therefore, there is only one solution to the equations, so that
we prove that there is a unique pair of (µ1, µ2) for a given pair (α1, α2).¤
Based on the proof above, we will have a disjoint division of the 4-dimensional
channel state, nodes will have different move and actions in different regions
because of the channel states. If z lies in the region Z0, both nodes find out
weak channel with strong background noise so they decide not to transmit. If
z falls in the region Z1 or Z2, one of the nodes decides not to transmit because
it predict the interference of other nodes and find out that interference of the
other nodes and the noise is so high. If z is in the region Z3, both nodes find
a relatively weak interference from the each other and allocate power based on
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µ∗1 =

1
α∗1
1
β1+1 z
β1
β1+1
11
− 1z11 , z11 > α∗1&
z22
α∗2
≤ α∗1
(
1+
( 1
α∗1
1
β1+1 z
β1
β1+1
11
− 1z11
)
z12
)
µ∗1(z11, z12, z21, z22), regions other thanZ0&Z1&Z2
0, otherwise
(3.32)
µ∗2 =

1
α∗2
1
β2+1 z
β2
β2+1
22
− 1z22 , z22 > α∗2&
z11
α∗1
≤ α∗2
(
1+
( 1
α∗2
1
β2+1 z
β2
β2+1
22
− 1z22
)
z21
)
µ∗2(z11, z12, z21, z22), regions other thanZ0&Z1&Z2
0, otherwise
(3.33)
the best strategy.
Since every pair of (α1, α2) determines a unique power strategy for each
nodes, we can derive the following results.
Proposition 2 A Nash equilibrium which can optimize the throughput always exists.
(3.32) and (3.33) are optimal power control policies of the two nodes. (µ∗1(z), µ
∗
2(z)) is
the optimum power allocation result (3.28) with a (α∗1 , α
∗
2) threshold pair that satisfies
the power constraints. It can be determined numerically.
Proof: We can further write (3.18) and (3.20) as
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
Z1
 1
α
1
β1+1
1 z
β1
β1+1
11
− 1
z11
×
pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz22dz21dz12dz11+∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
Z3
µ21(z11, z12, z21, z22)×
pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz22dz21dz12dz11 = SNR1 (3.34)
31
0
2
4
0
2
4
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
α2
SNR1
α1
SN
R(
db
)
Figure 3.2: The average SNR1 with respect to α1 and α2.
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
Z2
 1
α
1
β2+1
2 z
β2
β2+1
22
− 1
z22
×
pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz22dz21dz12dz11+∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
Z3
µ22(z11, z12, z21, z22)×
pz(z11, z12, z21, z22)dz22dz21dz12dz11 = SNR2 (3.35)
Based on the previous analysis of the channel state regions and the power
allocation, we can find out that SNR1 is a non-increasing function of α1, and a
non-decreasing function of α2. On the other hand, µ2(z) is a non-increasing
function of α2, and a non-decreasing function of α1. The verified result is
shown in the Figures (3.2) and (3.3). In order to prove the above proposition,
we assume two threshold pairs (α′1, α
′
2) and (α
∗
1 , α
∗
2) with α
′
1 = α
∗
1 , α
′
2 ≤ α∗2 ,
because of the monotonic properties of the curve we can derive SNR1(α′1, α
′
2) ≥
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Figure 3.3: The average SNR2 with respect to α1 and α2.
SNR1(α∗1 , α
∗
2) and SNR2(α
′
1, α
′
2) ≤ SNR2(α∗1 , α∗2). SNRi(α1, α2) is the SNR of user i
alone with the given threshold pair. Therefore, similar to [27], we set a starting
analysis point α1(0) = ε, α2(0) = ε and the value of ε is close to the maxi-
mum channel gain. From the previous verified result, SNRi(α1(0), α2(0)), i =
1, 2 are close to 0. After finding the starting point, we fix α1(n − 1) and
compute α2(n) by considering the average power constraint of user 1, which
is a solution to (3.35). Then we have α2(n) ≤ α2(n − 1) and SNR1(α1(n −
1), α2(n)) ≤ SNR1. Next step, we fix α2(n) to find the α1(n) by considering
the average power constraint of user 2, which is a solution to (3.34). There-
fore, we have α1(n) ≤ α1(n− 1) and SNR2(α1(n), α2(n)) ≤ SNR2. Iteratively, we
derive nonincreasing sequences α1(n), α2(n) with SNR1(α1(n), α2(n)) → SNR1
and SNR2(α1(n), α2(n)) → SNR2. Since SNRi, i = 1, 2 is not unlimited, both of
the sequences are considered to be lowerbounded. Then, there must exist the
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constants [32]
inf
n
α1(n) = limn→∞ α1(n) = α
∗
1 , SNR1(α
∗
1 , α
∗
2) = SNR1, (3.36)
inf
n
α2(n) = limn→∞ α2(n) = α
∗
2 , SNR2(α
∗
1 , α
∗
2) = SNR2. (3.37)
Therefore, based on the previous iterative numerical analysis, we proved that
there should be a pair of (α∗1 , α
∗
2) at the Nash equilibrium and the optimal
power policies (µ∗1 , µ
∗
2)can be reached.
From the above analysis, we proved the existence of the Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, we can even deliver a conclusion of the existence of admissible
Nash equilibrium in this game by using the concept of admissible Nash equi-
librium.
Definition 2 If no other Nash equilibrium strategy (µ′1, µ
′
2) satisfying that C1(µ
′
1, µ
′
2) ≥
C1(µ∗1 , µ
∗
2), C2(µ
′
1, µ
′
2) ≥ C2(µ∗1 , µ∗2) exists, and at least one of the equalities is strict,
a Nash equilibrium strategy pair (µ∗1 , µ
∗
2) is admissible.
We have the following result.
Proposition 3 A unique admissible Nash equilibrium always exists.
Proof: In this problem, we assume (µ∗1 , µ
∗
2) and (µ
′
1, µ
′
2) are the two power
allocation policy pairs at the Nash equilibrium. Correspondingly, their related
threshold values are (α∗1 , α
∗
2) and (α
′
1, α
′
2). They are also the solutions to the
equations (3.34) and (3.35). With the consideration of monotonic properties of
SNRi, i = 1, 2 on αi, i = 1, 2, we can find out that α∗1 = α
′
1 iff α
∗
2 = α
′
2, α
∗
1 > α
′
1
iff α∗2 > α′2, and α∗1 < α
′
1 iff α
∗
2 < α
′
2. Thus, under this condition, the threshold
values must have a strict order. We assume that α∗1 > α
′
1, α
∗
2 > α
′
2. Then,
we can demonstrate that C1(µ∗1 , µ
∗
2) > C1(µ
′
1, µ
′
2) and C2(µ
∗
1 , µ
∗
2) > C2(µ
′
1, µ
′
2)
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by considering the corresponding unique power policies (µ∗1 , µ
∗
2) and (µ
′
1, µ
′
2).
When we consider the channel state division previously, we find out that if we
decrease the threshold values, the area for Z3 will extend. According to (3.29),
µ1, µ2 will increase as well in this case. Therefore, it means both users have to
take more power to transmit data in the interference channel. It causes that
both user see increased interference from the other user, so that C1(µ∗1 , µ
∗
2) >
C1(µ′1, µ
′
2) and C2(µ
∗
1 , µ
∗
2) > C2(µ
′
1, µ
′
2).¤
In the example, we choose SNR1 = −12.21 dB, SNR2 = −16.98 dB, β1 =
2, β2 = 3. At the Nash Equilibrium, α1 = 0.7857, α2 = 1.0971. C1 = 0.1163
bps/Hz, C2 = 0.0501 bps/Hz.
In Fig. 3.4, we have the plot that describes the transmission rates of the
users as a function of node 1’s normalized QoS exponent β1. In previous dis-
cussion, βi represents the normalized QoS constraint. Larger βi indicates more
strict QoS constraints which will cause the transmission rate of the related node
decrease. In the figure, it is obvious that the transmission rate of node 1 de-
creases as β1 increases. This illustrates that as the buffer constraint becomes
more strict, the transmission rate will decrease. However, the rate of node 2
does not have much significant changes. This tells us that sacrificing one user’s
rate does not necessarily benefit the other user as long as both user’s have com-
plete information. In Fig. 3.5, we plot the transmission rate of the two users as
SNR1 increases while SNR2 is kept fixed. If SNRi increases, it means the re-
lated node allocate more power to transmit data. With more power consumed,
the transmission rate should increases in this situation. It is clear that transmis-
sion rate of node 1 in Fig. 3.5 increases as SNR1 increases. The transmission
rate of node 2 does not change much. It illustrates that the transmission rate
of node 2 is not affected by node 1 either.
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Figure 3.4: The rate of the two users as a function of β1. SNR1 = SNR2 = 0.02
β2 = 2
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Figure 3.5: The rate of the two users as a function of SNR1. SNR2 = 0.02
β1 = β2 = 2
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3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated a two-player non-cooperative game on
interference channels under QoS constraints. We formed a 4-node communi-
cation scenario. Though a game-theoretic analysis in this situation, optimal
power control policies at the Nash equilibrium are provided. We also prove
that a unique admissible Nash equilibrium exists in our two-player game. Nu-
merical results and discussions have been provided as well.
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Chapter 4
Non-Cooperative Security Games
for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
In this chapter, we are going to perform a game theoretic analysis of security
considerations in wireless ad hoc networks. As we introduced before, mobile
ad hoc networks belong to one of the categories of wireless ad hoc networks.
In mobile ad networks [33][34], such as vehicular networks [35], bluetooth net-
work and delay tolerant networks [36], authentication is a required primitive of
the majority of security protocols. Each mobile stored an asymmetric key pair
and all messages it sends are signed with the same private key. However, keys
are not always secure, it can be detected by external parties so that the locations
and trajectory of the mobile nodes can be learned. Hence, when the nodes au-
thenticate themselves to others, they have to avoid revealing privacy-sensitive
messages. In this situation, in order to achieve high location information se-
curity in wireless ad networks, pseudonym change approach has been used.
However, the privacy is not archived if only one node changes its pseudonym
because the tracker can still figure out in this situation. Therefore, in this case,
38
location information security requires help from its neighboring mobile nodes.
Because of the above reasons, the coordination of pseudonym changes has
attracted much interest and numerous methods have been proposed [37]. In
[38], a base station is used to coordinate pseudonym changes with prede-
fined network architecture. A mix zone strategy is also proposed in [35][39].
With out predefined infrastructure, mix zone strategy defines a certain region
for analysis purposes at first. Then, all the mobile nodes in this region will
adopt pseudonym change protocol in order to maintain its information secu-
rity. However, it does not have enough flexibility because the zone location
have to be learned before the node goes into the zone. Swing protocol [40] be-
comes a good candidate to solve this kind of issue. It will predefine a threshold
for the node to make pseudonym change decision. If a node’s security level
is lower than the threshold, the node will change its pseudonym in order to
achieve high location security. However, it still lacks flexibility to coordinate the
pseudonym change of the network with multiple nodes. In this background,
game theory method has been introduced to pseudonym change problem. As
we mentioned in the first chapter, game theory can be divided into two cat-
egories. One is a cooperative game and the other one is the non-cooperative
game. The players in cooperative game are not selfish. They are willing to
cooperate with their neighbors to achieve high location security. The players in
non-cooperative games are behaving selfishly. They just care about their own
privacy level and they are not willing to cooperate when their neighbors try
to improve their privacy level. Several papers analyze the problem in the con-
text of cooperate games. But in the real world, every node is acting selfishly.
Therefore, non-cooperative game is more realistic. Julien Freudiger is the first
one to investigate the game theoretic aspects of location privacy in mobile net-
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works [41][42][43]. He also analyzed several cases with non-cooperative game
approach. However, its approach has some issue to achieve the privacy with
small number of players.
In this case, we propose a game theory based anti-tracking protocol. Each
node tries to change its pseudonym based on its own payoff and the prediction
of its neighbor. In order to solve the problem for small number of players, we
use a bluffing strategy to mess up its own trajectory so that the tracker cannot
follow the mobile users. In order to make the protocol work well in the real
world, we consider a non-cooperative game scenario and the players do not
want their neighbors to know their types.
4.1 Preliminary Work
4.1.1 System Model
For this system, the network that we are focusing on is equipped with WiFi
or Bluetooth device [39]. Thus, the users can communicate with each other in
a certain range such as the vehicular network or a network communicated by
hand-held device directly.
In these networks, we will introduce a trusted third party into the network.
It will run an off-line certification authority and load the credentials for all the
mobile nodes in the networks. Every node should register with the certification
authority that preloads a set of public /private key pairs before it connects with
the network. The public key is considered as the ID of each node and can be
referred as its pseudonym.
The system that we are considering for this anti-tracking protocol is a dis-
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crete time system. At each time step t, the mobile nodes are moving into the
network and exchange information immediately after they can connect with
each other in the transmission range. The users in this system will also auto-
matically send preamble signal every certain amount of distance or time. The
information it sends will include a lot of information such as its authentica-
tion information, the time it sends this information, the position and the speed
in vehicle network. After sending this signal, it will discover their neighbors.
When another node receives this signal, it will control the legitimacy of the
sender and then verify the signature of its received message.
The other important part for anti-tracking is the adversary. It will eaves-
drop communications between mobile nodes in order to track their locations.
The effect of adversary depends on many factors like its coverage range and
the location. If the adversary has full coverage of the entire network, it is able
to track every mobile node and no node can easily get rid of it. Usually, the
adversary collects identifying information and location information from the
entire network in order to track the location of mobile nodes. With that loca-
tion information, the adversary can also run a tracking algorithm to track the
trajectory of the mobile nodes in order to get a more accurate result.
4.2 Location Security
In this section, we are going to introduce a location security model which can
illustrate the various security levels over time.
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4.2.1 Mix Zone and Security Level
There are several methods used for protecting the mobile node’s privacy so
that the node’s location information can be more secure and the node cannot
be easily tracked by the adversary. In this section, we are going to discuss
the pseudonym change technique. Based on the related work section, there
are some limitations for the traditional method. In order to solve these limita-
tions, several strategies will be introduced. In [39], a mix zone is introduced.
The mix zone method is described as follows: a number of nodes enter in a
fixed area which is named mix zone. In this specific area, the mobile nodes
change the pseudonyms simultaneously. Thus, the tracker cannot link the new
pseudonym with the old ones. However, it still has an problem regarding the
time and location correlation tracking. Therefore, we bring two more strategies
to compensate the original mix zone approach. First, mobile nodes can turn
off their transceiver making the mix zone a confusing point. Second, mobile
nodes can use a bluffing strategy to mess up the trajectory in order to keep the
security at a certain level.
Consider a mobile network with n mobile nodes. Like the swing protocol
mentioned in [40], once a group of nodes come into the mix zone at time t, one
node can initiate the pseudonym change process by broadcasting a trigger mes-
sage. If mobile node A has complete information of its neighbor, opponents
around A will choose its move by estimating type and distance with its neigh-
bor. If the opponents around A are all cooperative, all nodes including A will
change pseudonym simultaneously. If the type of nodes around A are defect,
A will measure the distance between itself and its neighbor. If the measured
distance is less than a specific threshold, A will choose bluffing strategy. If the
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measured distance is larger than the threshold, A will shut off its transceiver
and consider its next move for a while. During this time, nodes cannot com-
municate with other nodes. At the end of this time gap, all nodes make their
decisions about pseudonym change at the same time. If the node A does not
know the type of its opponent, it will change pseudonym by predicting its op-
ponent’s type. Then for bluffing strategy, if the total number of players in the
mix zone is less than 4, we will measure the distance and mess up the trajec-
tory. The traditional pseudonym change approach does not work quite well
for a small number of nodes because its opponents have higher probability to
show a defect type and even if its opponent is cooperative, its security level is
still pretty low. It makes us have the motivation to pull up the privacy level for
a small number of players.
From the adversary’s perspective, adversary will notice mobile nodes chang-
ing pseudonyms in its covered area, if pseudonym change happens. It will
compare the pseudonym before and after the change and then predict the
matching with highest match possibility. The location security level of a user i
involved in a successful pseudonym change at time T is
Hi(T) = −
n(T)
∑
d=1
pd|blog2(pd|b) (4.1)
where H is the security level of user i. T is the time that pseudonym of user i
has been changed successfully. pd|b is the probability that a new pseudonym d
correspond to an old pseudonym b. n(T) is the number of mobile nodes at time
T. Both the number of nodes and the unpredictability of their whereabouts in
the mix zone determines the achievable location privacy. If there is only one
node i changing pseudonym, the tracker will easily find out so the privacy
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level of user i is defined to be Hi(T) = 0. If we use the uniform probability
distribution for pd|b, the entropy will get a maximum value and we can use
log2(n(T)) as the security level of mobile node i.
4.2.2 Security Level Loss
In practice, the security level of mobile nodes changes based on location and
time. Therefore, we are going to use a model related to location security change
feature to analyze our system. In this work, since the security level will change
over time, the security loss function βi(t, Tli ) is introduced, where t is the cur-
rent time and Tli is the time of the last successful pseudonym change of node
i. For a given Tli , we can have:
βi(t, Tli ) =

λ ∗ (t− Tli ) for Tli ≤ t ≤ T fi
Hi(Tli ) for T
l
i ≤ t
(4.2)
where λ is the belief of node i about the tracking power of the adversary. λ
determines how fast the rate of privacy loss increases. We can find that the
maximum value of βi(t, Tli ) equals the location security level at the time that
last pseudonym changes. So with this loss function the user centric security
level of node i at time t is:
Hi(t) = Hi(Tli )− βi(t, Tli ) t ≥ Tli . (4.3)
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4.3 Anti-Tracking Game
In this section, we discuss the non-cooperative game theoretic aspects of achiev-
ing high location security level by changing multiple pseudonyms. The idea
of the pseudonym change game is how to make a reasonable decision like
pseudonym change or bluffing while considering location security level and
cost of related nodes.
The reason for us to build a pseudonym change game is the high cost of
requesting new pseudonym. If we use an equation to describe the cost, it
can be expressed as γ = γacq + γrte + γsil where γacq is the cost of acquiring
new pseudonym, γrte is the cost of updating routing table and γsil is the cost
of remaining silent. Since every node is considered as a selfish player in a
noncooperative game, its own behavior may sabotage the achievable location
security.
On the other hand, since the node’s behavior is selfish, nodes have incentive
to change pseudonym when the value of security level is too low in order to
maintain location privacy. Therefore, in this game-theory-based protocol de-
sign, we will investigate how a mobile node changes its privacy level dynami-
cally with the consideration of its neighbor nodes’ type, its own cost and secu-
rity level. We will also investigate the requirement for coordinated pseudonym
change game. In this game, the goal of nodes is to try to maximize their payoff
based on their current location security level and the associated pseudonym
change cost.
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4.3.1 Game Theory Concept
In this section, we discuss the concept of game theory [18] for our application.
As we introduced in chapter 1, game theory is a branch of applied mathemat-
ics that is used in the social sciences, most notably in economics, as well as
in biology (particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, polit-
ical science, international relations, computer science, and philosophy. Game
theory attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations, or
games, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the
choices of others. The game we consider in this chapter is a non-cooperative
game. It can also be divided into two categories: a complete information game
and an incomplete information game.
In a complete information game, a node knows the types of its opponent.
A pure strategy for player i is si ∈ Si, where Si = {C, D} is the pure strategy
space. A strategy profile s = {si}ni=1 is the players’ strategy set. Based on the
previous introduction about Nash equilibrium, if two strategies are mutual best
responses to each other, no player is willing to deviate from the given strategy
as long as they have mutual best responses. The concept of Nash Equilibrium
in this game can be defined as
Definition 1 A strategy profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if, for each player i:
ϕi(s∗i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ϕi(si, s∗−i) ∀si ∈ Si (4.4)
In other words, in a NE, none of the players can unilaterally change its strategy
to increase its payoff.
In an incomplete information game, a node does not have information about
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its opponent’s type. Thus, we adopt the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In this case, since we do not know the type of its opponent, a common prob-
ability distribution f (θi) is assigned to player in order to identify the player’s
type. After the type is assigned to players, the game is transformed from a
incomplete information game to a complete information game and all nodes
decides their payoff and next move based on their type. For this anti-tracking
protocol, since nodes have no idea about their opponent’s information, it is the
same case as the incomplete information game.
4.3.2 Game Model
Game theory is a very good tool to model the conflict and predict the behavior
of participants. In our anti-tracking protocol, we are setting up a pseudonym
change game. For this game, we assume the number of every node’s opponent
is greater than zero because the security level is zero if there is no opponent.
We also assume each node has the ability to search its neighbor nodes [44] and
find out the number of other nodes in the mix zone. The strategy is another
important thing that is used to form a game. In our game, each player has
two possible moves: Cooperate and Defect. By cooperating, a mobile node
change its pseudonym. By defecting, a mobile node retains its pseudonym.
As another important piece to form a game, the payoff function can be built
as ϕi(t) = bi(t) − ci(t), where bi(t) can be expressed as the location security
level of node i at time t, whereas the cost ci(t) depends on the security level
loss function and the updating cost of pseudonym at time t. We provide an
example which is shown in the Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 to make the whole game
process more clear.
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Figure 4.1: 8 players attends the game.
Figure 4.2: change of the payoff of node 1 over time.
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Fig. 4.1 is an example of 8 mobile nodes moving on a plane. The Fig. 4.2
shows the updating of the payoff of node 1 over time. The black line in Fig.
4.1 is the trajectory of node 1. At time t1, from Fig. 4.1, we see that node
2,3 and 4 meet in a mix zone and cooperate with node 1. In this case, every
node will change their pseudonym at time t1 in the Fig. 4.2 and their payoff
function values are updated:ϕi = Hi(Tli )− γ = log2(4)− γ = 1.8 and Tli = t1.
At time t2, node 1 meets node 5 in the mix zone but node 1 is a defect type
player at that time so node 1 does not do anything and the payoff of node 1
keeps decreasing according to the loss function β1 with slope λ. At time t3,
node 1 meets two cooperative nodes 6 and 7. Therefore, the payoff function
value increases again by increasing its security level. At time t4, the node 1
meets node 8 but node 8 is a defect type player and node 1 is a cooperative
type at this time. Hence, we have two cases: one case is that node 1 wastes one
pseudonym and the privacy level is dropped by γ. In the other case, the payoff
function will be pulled up a little bit by using the bluffing strategy. We will
describe this case more specifically in the next section. At time t5, there is no
other node staying in the mix zone so the payoff function goes down to zero.
4.3.3 Bluffing Strategy
Since we already have a general idea about our game model, we start to focus
on some specific issue. In the Fig. 4.2, we find that at time t4, the node 1 will
meet a defect type player. It means that if node 1 does not have some special
move, it will change its pseudonym without increasing its privacy level. In this
case, we propose a bluffing strategy to improve its anti-tracking performance.
The bluffing strategy is an approach that is similar to the path perturbation
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Figure 4.3: Trajectory perturbation region.
[45][46]. It requests the node to measure the distance between itself and its
opponent. If the distance L ≤ e, where e is a predefined parameter and it is
equal to d1 in the Fig. 4.3, it will recreate a smaller mix zone. And the node
do not change the pseudonym. It reports location information as mix zone
region but not the actual location of the users. In order to make the tracker
hard to follow the trajectory, we can try to generate some noise to mess up the
trajectory.
We need to add random variables x’ and y’ to the location information x,y
of the node. In order to make the path perturbation reasonable, noise have to
be close to the original point and could not be further than r. Thus, we have to
make sure (x− x′)2 + (y− y′)2 < r2. The noise available area is shown in the
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Figure 4.4: Trajectory perturbation example (before).
Fig. 4.3.
This strategy focuses on small number of nodes in our game model because
it’s not possible to have a lot of users staying in a small region. It’s also better
to choose changing pseudonym with a lot of users because the probability to
have a lot of cooperative players is increasing so that it can reach a very high
security level compared to its high cost. For complete information game, the
node knows its opponent’s type and payoff function, it can directly choose
bluffing strategy when its opponents are all defect type. For our anti-tracking
game, since it’s an incomplete information game, the node will use bluffing
strategy when the number of its opponents is less than 3. In this case, even
if the user successfully change its pseudonym, the privacy level is not quite
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Figure 4.5: Trajectory perturbation example (after).
high. So we choose this strategy to avoid the risk of exposure. After the node
chooses to use bluffing strategy, it does not change its pseudonym but it acts
like it has already changed its pseudonym by making the tracker follow the
other trajectory. The payoff function for this case will not be the original one.
If there are n players staying in the smaller mix zone, it means that tracker
has 1/n chance to guess the right trajectory and find out it did not change
its pseudonym. Therefore, the location security level in this case will be the
average privacy level E(Hi,n(t)).
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4.3.4 The Payoff Function
In this game model, if more than 3 nodes are willing to change the pseudonym,
then each of these three nodes improves its location security level at the cost
of a pseudonym change γ. If 3 or less number of nodes are participating in
the game, they either use the bluffing strategy or change their pseudonym
anyway despite the risk of wasting the pseudonym. Formally, we have: If
(L > e)&(si = C)&(nC(s−i) > 0)
Tli = t (4.5)
wi(t, Tli ) = 0 (4.6)
ϕi(t, Tli , C, si) = max(Hi(T
l
i )− γ, ϕ−i − γ) (4.7)
If (L > e)&(si = C)&(nC(s−i) = 0)
ϕi(t, Tli , C, si) = max(0, ϕ
−
i − γ) (4.8)
wi(t, Tli ) = wi(t, T
l
i ) + 1 (4.9)
If (L ≤ e)&(si = C)&(nC(s−i) = 0)
ϕi(t, Tli , C, si) = max(ϕ
−
i,e − γe, ϕ−i − γ) (4.10)
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If (si = D)
ϕi(t, Tli , C, si) = max(0, ϕ
−
i ) (4.11)
where ϕ−i = Hi(T
l
i ) − βi(t, Tli ) − γwi(t, Tli ) − γ is the payoff function at time
t−, which is the time immediately prior to t. ϕ−i,e = E(Hi(T
l
i ))− βi(t, Tli )− γe
is the payoff function for bluffing strategy, where γe is the cost of adding noise
to its location information.
Based on the previous discussion, we can represent the static pseudonym
change game in normal form (L > e) in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Pseudonym change game in normal form (L > e).
P1/P2 C D
C (H1(Tl1)− γ, H2(Tl2)− γ) (ϕ−1 − γ, ϕ−2 )
D (ϕ−1 , ϕ
−
2 − γ) (ϕ−1 , ϕ−2 )
Then we can find out that, for different type of players, we can get different
payoff function results. This tells us that the player type prediction is the key
to solve this kind of incomplete opponent’s information game.
4.4 Player Type Prediction
In this section, the game we are discussing is the incomplete information game.
In this case, the players do not know the payoff functions and the types of its
opponent. It is very close to the real world practical model. Therefore, our
anti-tracking protocol is built based on the incomplete information game.
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Figure 4.6: Description of the threshold.
4.4.1 Threshold Concept
In a complete information game, a player knows its opponent’s type and payoff
function so it can decide its own payoff function based on the knowledge of
its opponent. In an incomplete information game, a player does not know its
opponent’s type and payoff function. Therefore, it decides its move based on
its belief about their opponent’s type. The player’s type is defined as: xi = Hi−
βi − γwi − γ, which defines the payoff immediately before the game. In order
to define the player’s type for incomplete information game, we predefine a
strategy related threshold [14]. A player behaves defect, if the evaluated type
of a player is above a threshold xθ,i, otherwise it cooperates. It can be shown
in Fig. 4.6. With this threshold, we can define the probability of cooperation of
node i as
F(xθ,i) = P(x ≤ xθ,i) =
∫ xθ,i
0
f (xi)dxi. (4.12)
Hence, 1− F(xθ,i) is the probability of defection.
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4.4.2 Two Player Game
Let’s consider a two-player game analysis as a starting point. In this game,
each player computes the probability distribution function f (xi) in order to
decide other node’s type. Then, we can use a fixed threshold associated with
threshold xθ,2 for player 2, and compute the average payoff to player 1 for
cooperative move (C) and defect move (D) based on given type xθ,1.
E[ϕ1(C, s2)|x1] = F(xθ,2)(1− γ) + (1− F(xθ,2)) ∗max(0, (x1 − γ)) (4.13)
E[ϕ1(D, s2)|x1] = x1 (4.14)
The average payoff for player 2 is similar to the one for player 1.
The key for deciding the players’ type is computing the threshold strat-
egy which is also considered as Bayesian Nash Equilibrium by determining
the boundary of cooperative and defect activity. Therefore, let’s consider the
equation E[ϕ1(C, s∗2)|x∗θ1 ] = E[ϕ1(D, s∗2)|x∗θ1 ] for each player i. By solving this
equation we can derive the definition of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium [43] of
two players in incomplete information game.
Lemma 1 If

E[ϕ1(C, s∗2)|x∗θ1 ] = E[ϕ1(D, s∗2)|x∗θ1 ]
E[ϕ2(C, s∗1)|x∗θ2 ] = E[ϕ2(D, s∗1)|x∗θ2 ]
, (4.15)
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s∗ = (x∗θ1 , x
∗
θ2
) of the 2 player incomplete information
pseudonym change game is existed.
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Proof 1 Since we have E[ϕ1(C, s∗2)|x∗θ1 ] = E[ϕ1(D, s∗2)|x∗θ1 ], we can fix user2’s strat-
egy and consider player1 as xθ,1 ≤ x∗θ1 . Hence, we can have E[ϕ1(D, s∗2)|x∗θ1 ] −
E[ϕ1(D, s∗2)|xθ,1] = x∗θ1 − xθ,1 ≥ (1− F(xθ,2))(x∗θ1 − xθ,1) = E[ϕ1(C, s∗2)|x∗θ1 ] −
E[ϕ1(C, s∗2)|xθ,1]. Based on the above inequality, we can find out that if xθ,1 ≤ x∗θ1
the drop in payoff of D is larger than the drop in payoff of C. Therefore, C is the
best response. Similarly, we can get that if xθ,1 > x∗θ1 , then E[ϕ1(D, s
∗
2)|x∗θ1 ] −
E[ϕ1(D, s∗2)|xθ,1] ≥ E[ϕ1(C, s∗2)|xθ,1] − E[ϕ1(C, s∗2)|x∗θ1 ]. So the increase in pay-
off of D is greater than the increase in payoff of C. The best response should be D in
this case.
Theorem 1 All cooperate and all defect pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium s∗ =
(x∗θ1 , x
∗
θ2
) exists in the 2 player incomplete information pseudonym change game.
Proof 2 For all defection BNE which is x∗θ1 = x
∗
θ1
= 0, we can find out that E[ϕ1(C, s∗2)
|x∗θ1 = 0] = 0 = E[ϕ1(D, s∗2)|x∗θ1 = 0]. Similarly, for all cooperation BNE which is
x∗θ1 = x
∗
θ1
= 1− γ, we have F(x∗θ1) = F(x∗θ2) = 1. Then E[ϕ1(C, s∗2)|x∗θ1 = 1− γ] =
1− γ = E[ϕ1(D, s∗2)|x∗θ1 = 1− γ]. Therefore, we prove that we have all cooperation
and all defection BNE.
Other than all cooperate and all defect BNE, we can also find an interme-
diate threshold equilibrium under different conditions, where a player will not
only show cooperative activity or defect activity at this point.
Let’s consider an example to illustrate this incomplete information game.
Consider that the distribution on types is uniform. We can have the cumulative
probability as F(xi) = xi/(1− γ). Looking for an equilibrium with a threshold
xθ,i ≥ γ and solving equation (4.15), we can obtain xθ,i = 1− (γ/F(xθ,−i)) and
x2θ,i− xθ,i +γ(1−γ) = 0. From these two equations, we can get x∗θi ∈ {γ, 1−γ}.
We still assume γ < 0.5 because it will make the payoff function always larger
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Figure 4.8: BNE based on increasing cost.
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than 0 for the two player game. Then if F(xθ,−i) → 1, the solution x∗θi =
1− γ corresponds to an all cooperation BNE. If we take a look at intermediate
equilibrium, we can have E[ϕ1(C, s2)|x1] = F(xθ,2)(1− γ) + (1− F(xθ,2)) ∗ 0 =
x∗θ2 = x
∗
θ1
. Hence, we can confirm that C is the best response for xθ,1 > x∗θ1 . D
is the best response for xθ,1 < x∗θ1 .
Then we can numerically solve those equations based on different probabil-
ity distributions such as β distribution. In this case, we can see that the equilib-
rium changes based on different probability distribution value. If x ∼ β(2, 2), x
is symmetric and centralized around 0.5. For this distribution, we can obtain 3
BNE: all cooperate (blue), all defect(black) and intermediate equilibrium(pink
curve in the middle) and it is shown in the Fig. 4.8. Let’s focus on the interme-
diate equilibrium which is the solution for threshold. As the cost γ increases,
the probability of cooperation F(x∗θ ) increases as well. It means that the prob-
ability for a player to cooperate is increasing when cost is increasing. In other
words, if the cost is small, the nodes will become selfish. They do not quite
care about the whole cooperation success.
4.4.3 n Players Game
In this case, we change the number of game players from 2 to N. The idea is still
trying to compute the average payoff function. Let P(K = k) be the probability
that k nodes cooperate. We can get the following average payoff function as:
E[ϕi(C, s−i)] =
n−1
∑
k=0
P(K = k)ϕi(C, s−i) (4.16)
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Figure 4.9: BNE based on increasing number of users (γ = 0.3).
E[ϕi(D, s−i)] = ϕ−i (4.17)
where ϕ−i is the payoff function immediately before the pseudonym change
happens. Similar to the two player game, a BNE can be obtained as the solution
to the following system of n non-linear equations for the n variables xθ,i:
n−1
∑
k=0
P(K = k)ϕi(C, s−i) = ϕ−i , i = 1, 2, ....., n (4.18)
where P(K = k) = Ckn pk(1− p)n−k and pi = F(xθ,i). If p → 0, then x∗θ,i = 0,
P(K > 0) = 0 and P(K = 0) = 1. This means that the all defect equilibrium
exists. If p → 1, then x∗θ,i = 1, P(K < n− 1) = 0 and P(K = n− 1) = 1. This
means that all cooperation equilibrium exists when log2(n) − γ > ϕ−i for all
node i.
For intermediate values of p, we still numerically calculate the result. It
is also shown in the Figs. 4.9 and 4.10. We still use β function to evaluate
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Figure 4.10: BNE based on increasing number of users (γ = 0.7).
the BNE. For γ = 0.3, with a large number of players n, intermediate BNE
decreases, meaning that players cooperate with less possibility. It also shows
that all cooperate BNE disappears when the number of players increases. With
cost γ = 0.7, we can find out all cooperation equilibrium lasts longer when
γ increases. It looks like when the cost increases, the nodes have incentive
to cooperate with others. With lower cost, the larger n makes the nodes not
cooperate.
4.5 Anti-Tracking Protocol
As we discussed before, mobile nodes can execute pseudonym change using
swing protocol. Therefore, our anti-tracking protocol is also built on this swing
protocol but we need to consider more details. In the swing protocol, the
decision of mobile nodes depends on their privacy level compared to a fixed
threshold. In our case, the cost and probability of its opponent’s type have
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been considered. Hence, it changes from fix decision game to a dynamic non
cooperation game. We can develop much more realistic protocol than swing
protocol.
For a vehicle network, the car in the network has different speed and di-
rection. It is a small challenge to coordinate all the mobile nodes. Therefore,
we assume the mobile nodes will move into the mix zone with a speed range
so that the car did not leave the zone so quickly without finishing the whole
process.
We assume that the node knows the probability distribution f (x), number
of its opponents and its location privacy level ϕ−i
1: if (the speed is in the speed range) & (at least one neighbor) then
2: Broadcast initiation information to ask for changing pseudonym.
3: Go to 6
4: else
5: if (received initiation information) then
6: n=estimate(n)
7: calculate the BNE threshold x∗θ,i as a solution of
7: ∑n−1k=0 P(K = k)ϕi(C, s−i) = ϕ
−
i where P(K = k) = C
k
n pk(1− p)n−k and
pi = F(xθ,i)
8: if (ϕ−i ≤ x∗θ,i) then
9: play Cooperation
10: if (distance L < e & n < 4)then
11: keep pseudonym, adding noise, reporting the zone location and
update ϕ−i
12: else if(distance L > e)
13: change pseudonym, keep speed in the range
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14: else
14: change pseudonym, keep speed in the range
15: else
16: play Defect
17: else
18: keep pseudonym
4.6 Conclusion
We have considered a selfish environment in a vehicular network. In order to
get rid of the tracker, the mobile node changes its pseudonym. In this case,
every node changes its pseudonym by evaluating its own payoff function and
predicting its opponent’s type. We propose an anti-tracking protocol based
on a game-theoretic model. The game can be analyzed based on opponent’s
complete information and opponent’s incomplete information. In our case, the
opponent’s incomplete information game is more realistic. Hence, we first an-
alyze 2 player case to get the BNE and then expand this conclusion to multiple-
user situation. We use bluffing strategy to improve the low location security
level issues for small number of mobile nodes. We analyze the equilibrium and
find that when the cost increases the mobile nodes cooperate more. If the cost
is very small, the larger number of nodes will encourage nodes not to cooper-
ate. In the future work, we can consider the place and coverage range of the
adversary into this game and make the game more realistic. We can also use
a Kalman filter tracking algorithm to test if our anti-tracking protocol works
well.
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